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1Believing in Products Liability: Reflections on Daubert, 
Doctrinal Evolution, and David Owen’s
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
Richard L. Cupp Jr.1
David Owen believes in the law of products liability. By this I do not mean that 
he necessarily supports an expansive approach to products liability litigation. Professor 
Owen is a thoughtful centrist; in some areas he calls for expansion, and in others he calls 
for restriction. In asserting that he believes in the law of products liability, I mean that he 
feels there is value in thinking and writing about it as a distinct field of law rather than as 
merely bits and parts of tort, contract, and other areas of law. Primarily because products 
liability relies so heavily on tort and contract law, some respected scholars have seen 
little benefit and perhaps harm in treating products liability as a discrete field of law.2
Although he finds “much power” in critics’ arguments, Owen supports what he describes 
as “a major shift away from conceptualizing products liability problems as ‘tort’ or 
‘contract’ and toward viewing these problems as functionally distinct.”3
Professor Owen’s enthusiasm for products liability as a distinct area of law is not 
surprising, given that he is one of the field’s most prominent progenitors, or at least one 
1 Associate Dean for Research & John W. Wade Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of 
Law. 
2 In PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW Professor Owen cites and discusses the writings of a number of 
prominent scholars critical of treating products liability as a distinct field of law. See David G. Owen, 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 4-5 (2005). Critical analyses cited by Owen include J. Stapleton, PRODUCT 
LIABILITY ch. 13, at 341 et. seq. (1994); Anita Bernstein, Restatement Redux, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 
1681 (1995) (expressing sympathy for concerns about products liability as a distinct field of law, but 
ultimately embracing products liability at a legal category in Anita Bernstein, How Can a Product be 
Liable?, 45 DUKE L. J. 1, 4, 83 (1995)); William Powers, A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products 
Liability, 1991 U. ILL. LAW REV. 639, 639 (1991); Richard Speidel, Book Review, 33 VAND. L. REV. 813, 
817 (1980); Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American Products Liability, 53 S.C. LAW REV. 1225, 1254 
(2002).
3 Owen, supra note 2, at 5.
2of its most prominent nurturers. Of course he was not present when Benjamin Cardozo 
inked MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co,4 when Roger Traynor wrote his concurring 
opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp.5 or his unanimous opinion in Greenman v. 
Yuba Power Products6 or when William Prosser drafted section 402A for the American 
Law Institute.7 However, those founding fathers (unfortunately, “fathers” is the gender-
correct term due to the era) did not take products liability to maturity as a functionally 
distinct body of law. This task was left to the next generation of judges and scholars.
Enthusiastic judicial and legislative acceptance and expansion of products liability 
in the 1960’s and 1970’s provided the fundamental elements that enabled thinking about
the field as a distinct body of law. However, the work of Owen and other scholars to 
chronicle, categorize, and critique emerging products liability doctrines provided mortar 
to hold together the bricks created by courts and legislatures. Scholars such as Owen
likely created or shaped some of the bricks, too, in a field that underwent explosive and 
confused evolution and thus was constantly casting about for guidance and for stabilizing 
influences. 
Professor Owen’s work without question belongs on any list of the most 
important scholarship molding and nurturing products liability as a body of law.
Although he has written more than his share of outstanding theoretical scholarship,8 his 
4 111. N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (relaxing privity restrictions in negligence cases involving defective 
products).
5 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (creatively but unsuccessfully (at least at that time) arguing in 
concurring opinion that in defective product cases the California Supreme Court should new permit a new 
cause of action for strict liability in tort).
6 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (creating strict liability in tort cause of action for cases involving 
defective products).
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Section 402A (1965).
8 See, e.g., David G. Owen, ed., PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (Oxford Univ. Press, 
1995); David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the”Strict” Products Liability Myth, 1996 ILL. 
L. REV. 743; David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 
3efforts as a chronicler of judicial trends and rules have been particularly significant in 
encouraging courts and scholars to think of products liability as a distinct body of law. In 
1980 Owen, along with coauthor John Montgomery, produced the first products liability 
casebook ever to be published.  The casebook, which is perennially among the best-
sellers in the field, eventually added Mary Davis as another coauthor and is now in its 
fourth edition. The casebook’s quality in addressing products liability as a body of law is 
unsurpassed. It was already a well-established source when I began teaching, and I have 
relied on it each of the approximately 15 times I have taught products liability as an 
upper-division course. 
Owen’s coauthored three volume treatise with Stuart Madden and Mary Davis, 
MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, was published in 2000 and serves as a 
leading overview of the field useful both to practitioners and scholars.9 Earlier Owen
served as a coauthor on the torts hornbook originated by William Prosser and Page 
Keeton, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS.10 The famous Prosser hornbook, 
while preceding Owen’s work on treatises more narrowly directed at products liability, 
significantly added to practitioner’s understanding of the new and rapidly growing field. 
Supplementing his outstanding theoretical publications with several articles focused on 
chronicling the development of case law has expanded Owen’s audience and his efforts 
to address products liability as a functionally distinct field of law.11
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427 (1993); David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 
ALAB. L. REV. 705 (1989); David G. Owen, The Intellectual Development of Modern Products Liability: A 
Comment on Priest’s View of the Cathedral’s Foundations, 14 J. LEGAL STUDIES 529 (1985).
9 Mary Davis, Stuart Madden, & David Owen, MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2000). 
10 W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton & David G. Owen, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS (5th Ed. 1984).
11 In PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW Professor Owen cites the following articles he has published as 
foundations for sections of the book: David G. Owen, Special Defenses in Products Liability Law, 70 MO. 
L. REV. (2005) (forthcoming); David G. Owen, Proof of Product Defect, 93 KY. L.J. (2005) (forthcoming); 
4The work of Owen and others to encourage thinking about products liability as a 
distinct field of law have met with overwhelming success. An August, 2004 study 
counted roughly 15,000 products liability decisions “of some significance” in the United 
States.12 Since the 1960’s, an explosion of increasingly complex rules and principles have 
developed in products liability cases.13 Practicing lawyers and judges have increasingly 
considered products liability as a distinct practice area, and the great majority of 
American law schools have offered courses specifically focused on products liability as a 
field of law. Many jurisdictions, both domestic and international, have enacted products 
liability statutory schemes treating such cases as a distinct subject.14 When the American 
Law Institute decided to begin work on its RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS in the early 
1990’s, it decided to segregate products liability as a distinct project separate from other 
torts issues. Further, it decided to tackle products liability before addressing other torts-
related issues, recognizing that “products liability is highest in priority for reformulation, 
for it is socially significant and technically complicated.”15 Professor Owen served as the 
project’s editorial adviser. In assessing the debate over whether to consider products 
liability an independent field of law, Owen concludes:
David G. Owen, Inherent Product Hazards, 93 KY. L. J. 1 (2005); David G. Owen, Proving Negligence in 
Modern Products Liability Litigation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 1003 (2004); David G. Owen, The Puzzle of 
Comment J, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 1377 (2004); David G. Owen, Federal Preemption of Products Liability 
Claims, 55 S.C. L. REV. 411 (2003); David G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 80 DENVER U.L. REV. 345 
(2003); David G. Owen, Manufacturing Defects, 54 S.C. L. REV. 851 (2002); David G. Owen, Products 
Liability: User Misconduct Defenses, 52 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2000); David G. Owen, Products Liability Law in 
America, 11 Danno e Responsabilita 1999 (Italian trans.); David G. Owen, Products Liability Law 
Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273 (1998); David G. Owen, American Products Liability Law Restated, 6 
CONSUMER L.J. 161 (1998). Owen, supra note 2, at viii. Owen has also coauthored the most recent edition 
of West’s PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL (West 2005) (Jerry J. Phillips and David G. Owen, 
coauthors).
12 Owen, supra note 2, at 5.
13 Id. at 6.
14 Id.
15 Foreword, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (THIRD): PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tent. Draft 1, 1994), at xiii.
5There is simply no arguing that products liability draws heavily from tort, 
contract, and other fields of law. Yet, its separate treatment by courts, 
academics, practitioners and legislatures around the world dispels the view 
that modern products liability is bits and pieces of other fields of law, that 
it has no separate identity of its own. Academics may argue this point until 
the cows come home, but products liability is a field of law distinct unto 
itself.16
As noted above, Owen has himself to thank (although he would be too modest to 
do so) for some measure of products liability’s victory in attaining status as a functionally 
distinct field of law through his many years of work with products liability hornbooks, 
casebooks, theoretical law review articles and books, and law review articles that 
chronicle trends and rules in products liability case law. One of his most recent 
contributions to the field of products liability law is also among his most significant. 
Owen’s PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, published as part of the West Hornbook 
Series in 2005, is almost certainly destined to become one of the leading authorities on 
modern products liability law. Owen explains his goal for the hornbook as being “to trace 
the evolution of products liability law in America, to examine how legislatures and courts 
presently define and apply the law, and to explore an array of problematic issues on 
which courts and commentators disagree.”17 Hornbooks are sometimes perceived as (and 
in fact often are) merely overview recitations of general legal principles. Owen’s 
hornbook is much more than that, as it, in his words, “selectively critiques products 
liability law in America in the early stages of the 21st Century.”18
16 Owen, supra note 2, at v.
17 Id.
18 Id.
6Along with solid chronicling of products liability doctrines and trends,19 Owen’s 
elegant and thought-provoking normative analyses add significantly to the hornbook’s 
usefulness. One example may be found in his analysis of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals,20 the 1993 United States Supreme Court case that has been interpreted 
as significantly raising standards on the admissibility of expert testimony in federal 
courts, and that has strongly influenced expert testimony standards in state courts as well. 
I will use a bit of Owen’s discussion of Daubert as a launching point to share some 
reflections on the case and on products liability’s evolution as a field of law.
Daubert, perhaps the most significant civil case of any kind in the United States 
in the past quarter century, provides strong evidence for Professor Owen’s view that 
products liability has developed to the point that it should be considered as a field unto 
itself. For Daubert is a child of products liability. It was conceived in the explosive 
growth in reliance upon expert testimony that came with the equally explosive growth of 
products liability, and it was birthed in one of products liability’s early mass tort 
morasses: Bendectin litigation. Without products liability, there would have been no 
Daubert, and there would have been relatively little perceived need for  a decision like
Daubert. 
19 Owen borrows Prosser’s self-deprecating humor in describing the work of a chronicler as 
analogous to that of a rodent: “Credit belongs to William Prosser for observing that such chroniclers 
essentially are packrats, ‘unblushingly’ collecting and assembling bits and pieces from other scholars, 
judicial and academic.” Id. (citing William Prosser, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed., 1971), preface, at xi). 
Owen also notes another metaphor from the 12th Century French priest Bernard of Chartres: “dwarfs on the 
shoulders of giants.” Owen, supra note 2, at v (citing Jacques Le Goff, INTELLECTUALS IN THE MIDDLE 
AGES 12 (1957, 1985 (T. Fagan trans., Blackwell, 1993, citing Stephen G. Ferrulolo, THE ORIGINS OF THE 
UNIVERSITY: THE SCHOOLS OF PARIS AND THEIR CRITICS 1100-1215, at 154 (Stanford, 1985)). 
20 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7Professor Owen wisely decided to address Daubert in some depth in PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY LAW and, while he sees some grounds for concern about application of the 
case and its progeny, his overall verdict on Daubert’s legacy is fairly supportive:
By requiring experts to provide reasoned bases for their opinions, and by 
requiring that such opinions be relevant to the legal issues in the case and 
grounded in reliable methodology, the reliability and relevancy principles 
of Daubert, used properly, provide a firm foundation for the fair and 
rational resolution of the scientific and technological issues which lie at 
the heart of products liability adjudication.21
I will address two aspects of Daubert to share some of my own reflections on the 
case and its relationship to products liability as a distinctive field of law. The first aspect I 
will examine is the extent to which Daubert and its progeny might be both reflecting and 
generating evolution in the substantive common law of products liability. I will also 
provide some thoughts about how Daubert has both strengthened and weakened product 
liability’s ongoing quest to achieve a “rough sense of justice.”22
The first question, whether Daubert and its progeny have and will reflect or 
influence the substance of products liability law, is easily answered. In a word: yes. A 
decision perceived as having such a significant impact on the outcome of many products 
liability cases simply cannot avoid influencing substantive common law to some extent. 
Substance and procedure are not neatly separated in the real world of products liability. 
The broader goal of justice renders them inextricably intertwined, and a significant 
change to one must be felt by the other as well.
The evolution of the prominent products liability scholar Aaron Twerski provides 
an interesting illustration of how Daubert is influencing thought on substantive products 
21 Owen, supra note 2, at 377.
22 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). Judge 
Andrews used the phrase in the context of proximate cause analysis, but it applies equally well in 
describing the goals of tort law and products liability law generally.
8liability law. Dean Twerski, co-reporter with Professor James Henderson for the 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, is not known for having a 
generally expansive approach to products liability. Indeed, Twerski acknowledges that 
representatives of the plaintiffs’ bar, such as the American Trial Lawyers’ Association, 
assailed his RESTATEMENT (THIRD) as a “tort reform” package.23 One academic critic 
asserted during the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)’s drafting process that “The writings of 
[Twerski and Henderson] over the past two decades indicate a conservative penchant 
toward negligence and manufacturer-protective rules.”24 Another scholar recently 
described Twerski and Henderson as “academic critics of judicial expansion of product 
manufacturer liability.”25 Professor Henderson has written that “When I was first 
appointed [as co-reporter with Twerski for the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)], Plaintiffs’ Bar 
had, collectively, what might pass for an aneurysm.”26 In truth, both scholars have not 
always favored defendants in their writings.27 However, on balance, few would likely 
23 James A. Henderson and Aaron Twerski, The Politics of the Products Liability Restatement, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 686 (1998) (citing Larry S. Stewart, The ALI and Products Liability: “Restatement” 
or Reform?, TRIAL, Sept. 1994 at 28, 30).
24 Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles Heel, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1265, 1265 (1994).  
25 Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1702 (2005).
26 James A.  Henderson, Revising Section 402A: The Limits of Tort as Social Insurance, 10 TOURO 
L. REV. 107, 111 (1993). 
27 See Victor E. Schwartz, Process, Partisanship, and the Restatements of Law: The RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY – The American Law Institute’s Process of Democracy and 
Deliberation, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 743, 752 (regarding Dean Twerski and Professor Henderson, “a review 
of all of their written works reveals that neither scholar could be pigeon-holed as “pro-plaintiff” or “pro-
defendant”). In 1993, when beginning his work as co-reporter, Professor Henderson addressed the issue as 
follows:
For years I had written what was widely viewed, and I think fairly viewed, as pro-
defendant material. However, I never thought of myself as pro-defendant. I 
identified what I thought were flaws in the system, and I did it when it was not 
popular to do so. When I was your age, I was surrounded by people who wanted 
ever greater expansion. There was no frontier that was not worth crossing. I 
started my career saying ‘wait a minute, do we really mean this?’ Now, thinking 
as an academic, I have shifted and I am politically in the middle of the road. 
Maybe even in my off moments I am more liberal than many writers.
9argue that the balance of Twerski’s (or of Henderson’s) writings lean toward increasing 
opportunities for plaintiffs to sue product sellers.
The reasonable alternative design test promoted by Dean Twerski and Professor 
Henderson for design defect claims was, without question, the most controversial aspect 
of the products liability Restatement. Indeed, the debate in the ALI over this topic was 
fierce. The test requires that, as a prerequisite to prevailing in design defects claims, 
plaintiffs establish proof that a reasonable alternative design exists or could have been 
created and that failing to utilize the reasonable alternative design rendered the product 
not reasonably safe.28 This test heightens reliance on expensive expert witnesses, which 
are usually necessary to establish whether a reasonable alternative design would be 
feasible. 
The expense caused by the test’s focus on expert testimony was one of critics’
most significant complaints about the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)’s adoption of a reasonable 
alternative design requirement. Opponents of the expert testimony-driven reasonable 
alternative design test argued that it would bar access to the courts for all legitimate 
design defect claims where the claims’ value was not high enough to pay the price 
needed for expensive expert witness testimony.29 Many critics argued instead for a 
defectiveness test based on whether the product design violated a reasonable consumer’s 
Henderson, supra note 26, at 111-112.
28 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (THIRD): PRODUCTS LIABILITY Section 2(b) (1998).
29 See, e.g., Jerry J. Phillips, The Unreasonably Unsafe Product and Strict Liability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 129, 147 (1996) (“This requirement of a ‘reasonable alternative design’ on plaintiff imposes an 
especially onerous burden on the plaintiff, a burden that she may often be unable to meet”); Frank Vandall, 
Design-Based Liability in American Products Liability Law: State Judges Should Reject the Reasonable 
Alternative Design Standard of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 8 KANS. J. OF 
L. & ECON. 62, 63-64 (analogizing the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)’s reasonable alternative design requirement 
to the discrimination against poorer passengers in the movie Titanic, and suggesting that the test might 
share a fate similar to the ship).
10
expectations of safety, asserting among other things that the consumer expectations test 
provides greater protection of consumers’ interests.30
As Professor Owen notes in PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, reliance on expensive 
experts is less likely to be needed on the issue of defectiveness when courts adopt the 
consumer expectation test over the reasonable alternative design test, particularly in cases 
involving simple consumer goods.31 The Daubert decision came out at about the same 
time the debate between reasonable alternative design and consumer expectations began
raging in the ALI. Daubert, and particularly lower courts’ use of it as a tool to 
significantly toughen standards for experts, arguably provided another basis for critics to 
maintain that the reasonable alternative design test is simply too expensive to plaintiffs to 
achieve justice on a broader level. 
Although probably a majority of courts have adopted the reasonable alternative 
design test, a substantial minority have rejected it for the consumer expectation approach 
or other approaches. Courts’ reaction to the Henderson/Twerski RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY is nothing like courts’ reaction to the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND)’s section 402A. In the 1960’s and 70’s courts overwhelmingly adopted 402A; 
it has been described as the closest thing to “holy writ” ever produced by the ALI.32 The 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)’s reception by courts has been much more mixed, and one must 
30 See, e.g., Marshall Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restatement 
Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 668-69 (1995) (relegating consumer expectations to a “supporting cast” 
role and requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design would lead to the “astonishing” result of a 
plaintiff losing a case even if plaintiff establishes that the product’s risks outweigh its utilities); Ellen 
Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, The Third Restatement, and Reinstatement of Liability 
Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 889, 933 (2005) (arguing that eliminating the consumer expectations 
test in favor of a risk-utility test with a reasonable alternative design requirement inappropriately favors 
manufacturers over consumers).
31 See Owen, supra note 2, at 356.
32 James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the 
Restatement of Torts (Second), 77 CORN. L. REV. 1512, 1512 (1992).  See also Richard L. Cupp Jr., 
Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs: The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Standard 
Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76, 76 (1994).
11
wonder how influential Daubert may have been in convincing several courts not to adopt 
the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)’s expert-intensive approach. Further, if dissatisfaction with 
Daubert expands, it is interesting to wonder whether more courts will adopt the 
sometimes less expert-intensive consumer expectation test or other tests in the future.
Even before becoming a co-reporter for the products liability Restatement, Dean 
Twerski was one of the most prominent advocates of the perceived as pro-defense, 
expert-intensive, reasonable alternative design test.33 As noted previously, he was also 
perceived by many as having a restrictive view of products liability generally. 34 However, 
this same Dean Twerski, along with prominent evidence scholar Margaret Berger, is now 
arguing that in some cases involving non-essential drugs, courts should change the law to 
make it much easier to win by eliminating the causation of physical harm element. 
Further, he is directly pinning his argument for an expansion of products liability law on 
Daubert. This suggestion for expansion of the common law of products liability directly 
in response to Daubert is significant not only because the prominent and arguably 
conservative Dean Twerski coauthored the proposal, but also because of his co-author’s 
prominence in the field of evidence.35
The dramatic Berger/Twerski proposal is presented in an article recently 
published in November in the Michigan Law Review entitled Uncertainty and Informed 
Choice: Unmasking Daubert.36 The Berger/Twerski proposal is that an “informed choice 
33 Indeed, before being named as co-reporters, Dean Twerski and Professor Henderson coauthored a 
law review article proposing a new Restatement of products liability featuring the reasonable alternative 
design test for design and warning cases. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 32, at 1514.
34 See supra notes 23 through 26 and accompanying text.
35 See David E. Bernstein, Learning the Wrong Lessons from 'An American Tragedy’ 10 MICH. L. 
REV (2006) (forthcoming; available at Social Science Research Network: http://ssrn.com/abstract_id= 
775065) (“Margaret Berger and Aaron Twerski are among the leading scholars in their respective fields of 
Evidence and Products Liability”).
36 104 MICH. L. REV. 257 (2005).
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cause of action” should exist for pharmaceutical products even without proof that 
physical harm was caused when:
1) The causal relationship between the toxic agent and P’s harm is 
unresolved at the time of litigation and will likely remain unresolved;
2) The drug is not therapeutic, but rather its purpose is to avoid discomfort or 
to improve lifestyle;
3) It is almost certain that a patient made aware of the risk that is alleged to 
be associated with consumption of the drug would have refused to take it; 
and
4) Defendant drug company was aware of the potential risk or should have 
undertaken Rx testing to discover the risk and failed to provide the 
requisite information to the patient or physician.37
This Berger/Twerski proposal basically calls for a negligent infliction of 
emotional distress cause of action in a context far beyond the parameters of where courts 
have previously allowed such claims. They attempt to limit the usual Pandora’s Box 
concerns that attend efforts to expand negligent infliction of emotional distress claims by 
restricting their proposed lawsuit to situations involving less important “discomfort” or 
“lifestyle” drugs rather than “therapeutic” drugs, and by limiting it to situations in which 
causation is “almost certain.”38 Restricting the claim to situations in which the question of 
physical harm is proved to likely remain unproved may also be viewed as an effort to 
keep the proposal limited and thus more palatable.39
Dean Twerski and Professor Berger use Bendectin, the drug at issue in the 
Daubert case, and the drug Parlodel as illustrations of situations in which their proposed 
cause of action might be appropriate. Bendectin was marketed between 1957 and 1983 to 
37 Id. at 259.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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approximately 36 million women to treat morning sickness during pregnancy.40 Many 
lawsuits were filed contending that Bendectin caused stunted limbs in the children of 
mothers taking the drug, and that the manufacturer did not warn of this risk.41 Most 
courts eventually found as a matter of law that the evidence supporting these allegations 
of birth defects was not sufficiently strong to permit findings of causation.42 However, 
there was significant mosaic evidence of potential causation of birth defects that, 
according to Twerski and Berger, was sufficient to create an appropriate and 
understandable desire on the part of parents to know of the risks for a drug that merely 
alleviated discomfort.43 This mosaic evidence included “(1) in vitro (test tube) studies, (2) 
in vivo (animal) studies, (3) similarities between ingredients in Bendectin with chemical 
structures similar to known teratogens, and (4) retrospective epidemiological studies to 
support their contention that the drug caused birth defects.”44
Parlodel, the second drug cited as an example by Twerski and Berger, was 
marketed beginning in 1980 to women seeking to end lactation after childbirth.45 Some 
users brought lawsuits contending that the drug caused strokes, and that no warning of 
this risk was provided.46 Evidence existed suggesting that Parlodel may cause strokes, but 
most courts found it too idiosyncratic and unreliable to be presented to a jury.47 However, 
in 1989 Parlodel was withdrawn from the market as an anti-lactation drug because it was 
40 Id. at 268; see also Michael D. Green, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF 
MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 91, 180 (1996).
41 Berger & Twerski, supra note 36, at 268.
42 Id..
43 Id. at 268-69. 
44 Id. at 268.
45 See Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434,442 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Berger & Twerski, 
supra note 36, at 269.
46 See Berger & Twerski, supra note 36, at 269.
47 See id.
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found to have no greater benefit than aspirin.48 Twerski and Berger believe Parlodel is a 
good illustration of a case in which their proposed new cause of action would be 
warranted because “It is hard to believe that a woman warned of the risk of strokes and 
told of the comparative safety of treatment by over-the-counter analgesics would opt to 
take Parlodel.”49
Twerski and Berger argue that cases such as Bendectin and Parlodel involving 
uncertain risk are the hallmark situations in which Daubert denies recovery.  They are
clearly concerned that many cases involving drugs and other toxic agents that may have 
serious risks are lost because of difficulties proving causation to an acceptable certainty,
rather than because causation does not in fact exist. They are also concerned that
Daubert’s high evidentiary bar exacerbates the problem of proving causation in many 
legitimate claims. Declaring that “The current state of Daubert drug litigation is 
intolerable,”50 they note that:
Plaintiffs have, in large part, been stymied by their inability to establish 
that toxic agents, no matter how potentially dangerous, were actually 
responsible for the harms they have suffered. Their difficulties in this 
regard have increased exponentially since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.51
They conclude “That a toxic drug cannot be proven to have definitively caused a harm 
does not mean that plaintiffs should be deprived of the right to choose whether they wish 
to subject themselves to the material risk of that harm actually taking place.”52
48 See Eve v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., No. IP 98-1429-C-Y/S, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4531, at *14-20 
(S.D. Ind. March 7, 2001); Berger & Twerski, supra note 36, at 270.
49 Berger & Twerski, supra note 36, at 270.
50 Id. at 288.
51 Id. at 258.
52 Id. at 288.
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I have significant sympathy for these concerns. Who would dispute that 100 years 
from now scientists will have clear knowledge that many drugs currently in use cause 
serious harm even though plaintiffs are not able to meet the high burden of proving so at 
present? Further, as Professor Owen points out in PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, 
manufacturers have an inherent advantage in expert-reliant cases because they have 
access to experts naturally, being in the business of making the product – their experts 
may even be their own employees who designed the product. Plaintiffs must hire an 
academic or a private consultant.53 Further, manufacturers typically pay for their experts 
with insurance money, and have much deeper pockets to foot these bills than do injured 
consumers, who have to pay out of their own pockets, which are usually shallow rather 
than deep.
Having expressed sympathy with the concerns voiced by the Berger/Twerski 
proposal, I will not hold my breath expecting a majority of courts to fall in line with it, 
despite the prominence of its authors. Eliminating the causation of physical harm element 
in some products liability cases is a truly bold proposal, not an evolutionary baby-step. 
Further, as the authors acknowledge, courts would have difficulty defining with 
53 See Owen, supra note 2, at 358. Owen notes:
The bulk of experienced and otherwise qualified experts in most fields of product 
design, manufacturing, and labeling are employed by private industry, often by the 
manufacturing enterprises who are defendants in products liability litigation. 
Thus, because such persons are already in its employ, a manufacturer usually has 
little difficulty in finding appropriate engineering and other experts to help defend 
a products liability case. Indeed, such experts may include the very persons who 
designed the accident product, advised on appropriate warnings, and designed and 
supervised the assembly process by which it was produced. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, on 
the other hand, generally are limited to two principle resource pools for expert 
witness talent: universities and private consultants.
Id.
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consistency the “lifestyle or discomfort” – i.e., lower utility – drugs for which Berger and 
Twerski would like to limit their standard to keep it from being too broad.54 I myself took 
a stab in a 1994 article at arguing for a more relaxed liability standard in cases involving 
prescription products with primarily cosmetic utility, and courts have shown remarkable 
restraint in not rushing too quickly to follow my suggestion.55
Professor David Bernstein recently wrote a paper expressing additional concerns 
about the Berger/Twerski proposal.56 Much of Bernstein’s critique centers on 
disagreement with an assertion by Twerski and Berger that Bendectin provides, in 
Professor Bernstein’s words, the “paradigmatic example” of why courts should adopt the 
Berger/Twerski proposal.57 Bernstein argues that if Bendectin, a safe drug in his view, is 
an example of a situation in which the Berger/Twerski cause of action would be 
appropriate, the cause of action is clearly overbroad. He notes that by 1977 fourteen 
epidemiological studies had been performed on Bendectin, and none of them found an 
association between the drug and birth defects.58 He concludes that “by the early 1980’s, 
there was a solid consensus in the medical community that Bendectin was not a 
teratogen.” Rather than serving as an illustration of why the Berger/Twerski proposal 
54 See Berger & Twerski, supra note 36, at 288 (“We are aware that there is no bright line that can be 
drawn between lifestyle and therapeutic drugs. Nonetheless, the distinction is important as a beginning 
point in recognizing a cause of action for informed choice. In the former, the issue of decision-causation, 
that is, whether the plaintiff would have chosen against taking the drug if informed of the possible serious 
side effects, is much clearer”).
55 See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Sharing Accountability for Breast Implants: Strict Products Liability and 
Medical Professionals Engaged in Hybrid Sales/Service Cosmetic Product Transactions, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 873 (1994).  Similarly to Dean Twerski and Professor Berger, I acknowledged in the article that 
clearly distinguishing medical products with primarily cosmetic utility from medical products with 
restorative utility would be difficult. However, given the rise in use of cosmetic medical products and the 
lack of special societal utility of such products I urged courts to make the distinction when possible and to 
exclude primarily cosmetic products from comment k exclusion from strict liability in hybrid sales/services 
transactions. See id. at 911-12. 
56 See Bernstein, supra note 36 (forthcoming; available at Social Science Research Network: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id= 775065).
57 Id. at 2.
58 Id. at 2-3. 
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should be adopted, Bernstein sees Bendectin litigation as an illustration of “unreasonable 
fears of the lay public, stirred by irresponsible interest groups, hired gun delusional 
experts, credulous media coverage and plaintiffs’ lawyers.”59 He adds several additional 
concerns about the proposal, including assertions that:
1) “The proposal invites reliance on unreliable testimony;”60
2) “Jurors are not competent to determine subtle risk assessment issues;”61
3) “Even assuming juror competence, the proposal asks too much of 
jurors;”62
4) “The proposal ignores the problem inherent in multiple trials;”63
5) “The proposal fails to consider the potential costs of informed choice 
litigation;”64
6) “The informed choice proposal would lead to a vast surfeit of warning;”65
and
7) “The informed choice proposal may be barred by the preemption 
doctrine.”66
Without addressing each of Professor Bernstein’s concerns in detail, it may be 
useful to note that much of his critique could be seen as reflecting broader views about 
the efficacy or lack of efficacy of our current products liability system. For example, 
Bernstein’s concerns that juries are not good at determining subtle risk assessment issues, 
and his concerns that the dynamics of mass litigation often force defendants to settle even 
59 Id. at 5-6. 
60 Id. at 15.
61 Id. at 20.
62 Id. at 21.
63 Id. at 23.
64 Id. at 24.
65 Id. at 27.
66 Id. at 28.
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nonmeritorious claims – both may implicate products liability cases well beyond those in 
the limited target area of the Berger/Twerski proposal.
Professor Bernstein’s use of a Daubert-related analysis to perhaps reveal some of 
his more general reservations about modern products liability litigation is not surprising 
or unique. I perceive that the pattern of courts and commentators finding in Daubert and 
discussions of Daubert a launching point for expressions of broader concerns that 
products liability is too expansive or too restrictive is both common and understandable. 
Professors Ed Cheng and Albert Yoon perhaps make an analogous point in a recent 
empirical article arguing that Daubert’s strongest impact has been its educational 
function in sensitizing courts to the dangers of junk science generally, regardless of 
whether a case is tried in a Daubert jurisdiction or in a Frye jurisdiction.67 The specifics 
of Daubert’s holding are not what has mattered most for products liability law; what has 
mattered most is how courts and commentators have used Daubert to change and to 
engage in a broader discussion about what is good and bad for our products liability 
system.
Where the broader Daubert-inspired discussion will lead us of course remains 
uncertain. However, judicial and scholarly reaction to Daubert, such as the sometimes 
conservative Dean Twerski’s call for doctrinal expansion, both reflects and predicts some 
level of evolutionary impulse in products liability law. We should not expect to be able to 
fully appreciate the impact it will make quickly – thirteen years has past since Daubert
was decided, and what we do not know about its full impact on products liability still 
67 Edward K Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific 
Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 503 (2005) (addressing empirical study undertaken by 
authors in which removal rates to federal court were found to follow the same trends both in Daubert 
jurisdictions and Frye jurisdictions, leading the authors to conclude that defense lawyers may not perceive 
the federal Daubert rule to offer significant advantages over Frye).
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substantially outweighs what we do know about it impact. The common law of products 
liability and of torts may experience rapid evolutionary jolts, such as the meteoric rise of 
strict products liability in the 1960’s and 1970’s, but quick growth spurts such as this are 
not the end of the story.  From a long-term perspective, tort and products liability law are 
things that usually meander slowly toward, in the words of Judge Andrews in Palsgraf
quoted previously, a “rough sense of justice.”68
I use the phrase “meander toward” intentionally, rather than “stride crisply 
toward,” or “run toward.” The common law of torts and of products liability meander
toward a rough sense of justice perhaps a bit like tourists with little sense of time 
meander from one edge of a town they are visiting to the far edge of the town. Torts and 
products liability move in starts and stops, they wander from one side of the boulevard to 
the other to investigate the sights, they venture down interesting side streets and alleys 
only to find them leading to dead ends, and then return back to the main street to meander 
further along their way toward justice. 
I say this with some fondness, not derision, because eventually leisurely tourists
reach their destination, and along the way they have seen and experienced much more of 
the town’s important aspects than had they scurried straight across town without any 
interest in the landscape. I do not perceive the common law of torts or of products 
liability as consciously following a corrective justice model, a law and economics model, 
a deterrence model, or any other limited model of justice. Their shared guidance system 
is broader than any of those models; it is at the same time more complex in its 
manifestations and more simple in its goals. Again in the words of Judge Andrews 
(although he was applying them specifically to proximate cause), tort law’s model is 
68 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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simply seeking to fulfill a rough sense of justice.69 The same model applies to products 
liability. As is the case with those respectful of a broad range of religions, the common 
law paths of torts and of products liability find some truth in each of the models 
academics champion as their proper goal, and their sense of justice is a rough 
combination of nearly all of the proposed models. Thus, sometimes the path of the 
common law toward its sense of justice cannot be easily or neatly explained, but even in 
such situations its progress can often be vaguely felt.
Perhaps what is being felt in courts’ and scholars’ current grappling with the 
impact of Daubert is that the case and its progeny have at the same time both helped and 
hurt courts’ search for a rough sense of justice in products liability law. There are of 
course many roads to justice and injustice, and I will briefly highlight two that are 
especially relevant to Daubert. Objectively uncertain results invite injustice, and this 
form of injustice arises when courts do not enforce a sufficiently strenuous evidentiary 
threshold. However, injustice also exists when there are thousands or perhaps hundreds of 
thousands of meritorious cases that can never be undertaken because it is too expensive to 
do so or because, although the plaintiff is correct, she cannot prove she is correct with 
sufficient certainty under a particularly demanding standard.70 The more strictly courts
apply Daubert to avoid injustice from junk science, the more courts also create injustice 
by pricing out valid claims where expensive expert fees are not economically viable or 
where the high standard makes proving valid cases impossible. This conflict presents a 
balancing question, and how we feel about the balance may say as much about our
personal leanings as it does about justice itself.
69 Id.
70 See Berger & Twerski, supra note 36, at 271 (“Preparing for and litigating Daubert has 
undoubtedly made litigation more expensive than before”).
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In products liability cases the most interesting questions about Daubert might 
relate less to specific evidentiary standards than to whether we think products liability 
law simply expanded too much in the latter half of the twentieth century. Daubert may be 
in effect a reform tool for those who think we have too much products liability litigation, 
and a powerful impediment for those who think our level of products liability litigation 
helps rather than hurts society.
When pondering how reaction to Daubert reflects broader views, it is interesting 
to contemplate judicial psychology. It is easy to imagine that judges might feel most
strongly the injustice of watching a jury reach the wrong conclusion because unreliable 
evidence was slickly marketed to them. Judicial frustration and indignation over 
repeatedly witnessing such results is understandable and of course appropriate. Another 
form of injustice, however, is neatly hidden from direct judicial view. Judges see the 
undeserving plaintiffs who sometimes win under looser rules, but they do not have to see 
the thousands of injured plaintiffs with legitimate cases who never get to a courtroom 
because of the financial or evidentiary burden Daubert imposes. However, just because 
the injustice against deserving plaintiffs is less visible does not make it any less real. 
Having an especially demanding standard that leads to a tidy sense of justice for judges 
presiding over trials can cause significant structural unfairness that is conveniently easy 
not to contemplate.
A factor going the other way is that visible injustice in the judicial system has the 
additional cost of eroding the public’s confidence in the courts. If citizens believe that 
trials with fli msy expert evidence are an exercise in snake oil salesmanship rather than 
objective justice, the civil justice system is harmed. But perhaps we should be concerned 
22
about the possibility of courts favoring a more visible manifestation of justice over a less
visible manifestation but equally real manifestation of justice based on the very issue of 
public visibility. Such favoritism may represent a form of snake oil salesmanship in itself, 
ironically utilized, in this context, to limit snake oil salesmanship at trials.
Those who do not believe products liability’s expansion over the past 50 years has 
been on the whole more negative than positive have several choices in reacting to 
Daubert. One is to oppose its current application and argue that it causes more harms
than benefits to justice. This may not be the same thing as opposing Daubert itself, 
because so much of Daubert’s impact seems to be in how it has been interpreted and 
applied. Another approach could be to argue that perhaps courts should follow both
impulses discussed above: to enhance objective justice in trials where expert testimony is 
truly central by keeping something like the current Daubert standard, but at the same 
time applauding and encouraging substantive evolution to make civil litigation less 
frequently a battle of the increasingly expensive experts, where such evolution is 
consistent with best-achieving a rough sense of justice. 
Although he places caveats on his praise and I place caveats on my criticism, on 
balance Professor Owen’s assessment of Daubert and its implications may be more 
positive than my own. In PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, after citing a large number of cases 
in which courts excluded plaintiffs’ expert testimony based on Daubert, he writes:
It may well be that the experts in each case in which the testimony 
was excluded propounded bad science, or perhaps the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys simply failed to adequately prepare their experts on the 
Daubert requirements before the trial, or perhaps they failed at trial 
(or at a Daubert hearing) to provide the court with a sufficient offer 
of proof.71
71 Owen, supra note 2, at 370.
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In my thinking this fails to pay sufficient attention to some important possibilities 
that must be factors in many lawsuits involving Daubert exclusions. For example, given 
the frequency with which drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration and once 
considered safe are eventually recognized as being in fact dangerous, in many cases
plaintiffs’ excluded expert testimony is doubtless correct in its assertions, and plaintiffs
should have prevailed, except that they could simply not afford to bring their cases to trial 
had they spent enough on testing and other indicia of reliability to meet the very high 
Daubert standard.
Further, even in situations in which financial costs are not an insurmountable 
barrier, the scientific conclusions of plaintiffs’ experts in many cases are likely correct, 
and plaintiffs should have prevailed, except that the scientifically correct conclusion was 
not a scientifically provable conclusion – at any cost -- under the very high Daubert
standard. However, Professor Owen does not leave the assertion quoted above 
unmitigated. In the same paragraph he notes “the fact remains that only infrequently is 
Daubert invoked to exclude expert testimony proffered by defendants,”72 and elsewhere 
he cautions that “courts must sedulously avoid using this important gate-keeping function 
to bar evidence that actually may be sound.”73 I would prefer more elaboration on 
Daubert’s significant costs to justice in addition to the discussion of its benefits, but 
Professor Owen at least acknowledges that the standard may be subject to abuse.
Regardless of one’s views about Daubert and its progeny, the lavish attention 
paid to the case by courts and scholars and its unique importance to products liability 
serve as powerful evidence for Professor Owen’s assertion that products liability has 
72 Id. at 370.
73 Id. at 377.
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come of age as a body of law, and that its inevitable future changes will be viewed as 
evolution of a functionally distinct legal field. His belief in the law of products liability 
is, with time, becoming increasingly irrefutable.
